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Abstract
This article reviews recent work that generalizes a random matching model of
money to permit there to be a mix of transactions: some accomplished through
the use of tangible media of exchange and the rest through some form of credit.
The generalizations are accomplished by specifying assumptions about common
knowledge of individual histories that are intermediate between no common
knowledge and complete common knowledge. One of the speciﬁcations permits
a simple representation of the sense in which more common knowledge is
beneﬁcial. The other permits a comparison between using outside money and
using inside money as a medium of exchange.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Not so many years ago, when I used a credit card at
some retail outlets, the clerk would consult a printed
document that contained the numbers of cards which
were not to be accepted. From the well-worn look of the
document, it seemed that an updated version was issued,
perhaps, once a week. Now, of course, credit cards are
checked almost instantaneously as cards are swiped
through an electronic reader. A plausible surmise is that
a consequence of the change is that credit cards are used
more frequently—primarily because more rapid check-
ing of credit histories makes it proﬁtable to offer credit
cards to more people. Therefore, the economy comes
closer to being cashless. What is perhaps less evident is
whether the enhanced ability to maintain, access, and up-
date records is a crucial determinant of how transactions
are made. This article reviews recent theoretical work
that suggests that such ability is crucial. The work ap-
plies mechanism design
1 to model environments to illus-
trate how optimal payment arrangements and the implied
level of welfare depend on the ability to maintain, ac-
cess, and quickly update records of individual histories.
The ﬁrst section of the article defends my focus on
knowledge of individual histories and my use of mecha-
nism design. In particular, I argue, largely on the basis
of other people’s work, that assumptions about the ex-
tent to which knowledge of individual histories is public
knowledge ought to play a crucial role in good theories
of money. Then I turn to recent applications of that con-
clusion which take place against the background of ran-
dom matching models of money. First I describe the
consequences for welfare and the use of outside money
of a lag in updating the public record of individual his-
tories. (See Kocherlakota and Wallace 1998.) Then I
describe the consequences for the roles of inside and
outside money of having some people with known his-
tories and others with unknown histories. (See Caval-
canti and Wallace 1999a, b.) (Inside money is a form of
private credit; it is someone’s liability. It could also be
called private money. Outside money, in contrast, is a net
asset for the economy as a whole.)
A Theory of Money
I start from what ought to be common ground: the classi-
cal dichotomy and the quantity theory of money. To be
precise, I start from a model in two parts: a general
competitive equilibrium model (of allocations and rela-
tive prices) and a single quantity theory equation, which
can be interpreted as a supply-equals-demand-for-money
equation. This model is recursive in that the variables in
the general equilibrium part are determined without ref-
erence to the quantity theory part, which, given those
variables, determines the price level. This model has two
serious defects: it is incoherent and it fails to address the
beneﬁts of monetary exchange.
To see the incoherence, notice that the general equi-
librium part of the model is a complete description of a
nonmonetary economy with a speciﬁcation of people,
preferences, endowments, resources, and technologies.
When I add the single quantity theory equation, I am led
to ask who owns the money and why it has value, among
other questions. Patinkin (1965) pointed out a symptom
of this incoherence: the model fails to satisfy Walras’
law.
As regards the second defect, a long tradition asserts
that monetary exchange is helpful in overcoming diffi-
culties of exchange, difficulties that economists now call
absence-of-double-coincidence difficulties. Because the
general equilibrium part of the model has complete com-
petitive markets—and, therefore, does not depict absence-
of-double-coincidence difficulties—the model cannot dis-
play any sense in which monetary exchange is helpful.
The history of monetary theory in the last half century
is a history of attempts to overcome these two defects.
The incoherence has been relatively easy to overcome. In
particular, economists have become adept at formulating
coherent intertemporal models in which money is given a
role through one of the following devices: real balances
as an argument of utility or production functions, cash-in-
advance constraints, or transaction costs. These approach-
es, however, are widely viewed as shortcuts and not as
serious attempts to overcome the second defect. More-
over, as I will explain, these approaches are almost cer-
tainly not valid shortcuts or summaries of models which
do depict the sense in which monetary exchange is help-
ful.
To proceed to a more detailed discussion of the sec-
ond defect, I will deﬁne monetary exchange to be the use
of a tangible but intrinsically useless object (for example,
shells, stones, or pieces of paper) as a medium of ex-
change. Then a minimal condition for overcoming the
second defect is to have a setting or environment in
which the use of such an object, from now on called
money, is essential in the sense that its presence makes
possible outcomes that could not be achieved in its ab-
sence.
To make such a claim precise, I need an institution-
free way to describe what outcomes can be achieved with
and without the use of money in a given environment.
That, in turn, calls for the application of mechanism
design to the environment. The application of mechanism
design leads immediately to a very general result that
justiﬁes a focus on knowledge of individual histories.
The result is that imperfect knowledge of individual his-
tories is necessary for the essentiality of money. This
necessity claim goes back at least to a 1973 paper by
Ostroy (1973). (See also Townsend 1989 and Kocher-
lakota 1998.)
A simple way to prove the necessity claim is to pro-
ceed by contradiction. Take any model with complete
public knowledge of individual histories and with money
and show that the outcome of any game that makes use
of money can be duplicated by a game which does not
make use of money. By making use of money, I mean
that holdings of it at some point in time inﬂuence what is
produced and consumed. By not making use of money, I
mean that holdings of it are ignored. That is, start with a
game that makes use of money. Then create another
game that is identical except that the role of money in
the ﬁrst game is replaced by an intangible state variable
that exactly mimics the money in terms of individual en-
dowments and individual transitions from one amount of
money to another. In addition, let money be ignored in
the new game. (Mathematically, let the intangible state
variable be in the same set as money. Thus, if money
holdings are a nonnegative real number, then let the in-
tangible state variable be a nonnegative real number.) Itfollows that the two games have the same set of equi-
libria.
To elaborate a bit, notice that the assumption that in-
dividual histories are known implies that whatever is
known about holdings of money can also be known
about the intangible state variable. Also, because the
money is an intrinsically useless object, the intangible
state variable can fully substitute for it under whatever
constraints applied to the initial allocation—participation
constraints or truth-telling constraints. That would not
be true if money were a commodity like oil, which has
nonmonetary uses. And, again, because the money is an
intrinsically useless object, it can be completely ig-
nored—something which would not be true if money
were an ordinary commodity. Finally, the assumption
that individual histories are known is crucial. If not, the
intangible state variable can be misrepresented to an ex-
tent that money holdings cannot, because money hold-
ings are tangible.
The necessity result can be used as a basis for a criti-
cism of the shortcut models mentioned earlier and of
some other monetary models. In particular, imperfect
knowledge of individual histories and its consequences
—for example, for credit—do not appear in those mod-
els. Therefore, those models are not consistent with the
essentiality of money. Put differently, imperfect knowl-
edge of individual histories should appear in those mod-
els if they represent valid summaries (sometimes called
reduced forms) of models in which money is essential.
For what follows, I want to make a different appeal to
the necessity result. Perfect knowledge of individual his-
tories implies no role for money. No knowledge of indi-
vidual histories, while giving the greatest scope for a role
for money, leaves no role for credit in any form. An
obvious route to getting a mix of transactions, which is
what exists in actual economies, is to specify some de-
gree of imperfect knowledge of individual histories.
The Background Environment
I use a single background environment throughout, one
that is adapted from the work of Shi (1995) and Trejos
(1995), which, in turn, are adaptations of earlier work of
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). As originally formulated,
these were simple settings which made explicit long-
standing ideas about the connection between absence-of-
double-coincidence difficulties and the need for tangible
media of exchange.
In my setting, time is discrete. There are N > 2 per-
ishable types of goods in each period of time, N spe-
cialization types of people, and a [0,1] continuum of
each type. Although I will limit attention to symmetric
outcomes, I assume that each person is identiﬁed by a
(specialization) type—an integer in the set {1, 2, ..., N}
and a real number in the interval [0,1]—an identiﬁca-
tion which I will assume throughout to be common
knowledge. A type n person consumes only good n and
produces only good n + 1, modulo N. Each person
maximizes expected discounted utility with a discount
parameter β∈ (0,1). The period utility function is u(x)−
y, where x ∈ R+ is the amount of the relevant good
consumed and y ∈ R+ the amount of the relevant good
produced. The function u is differentiable, is strictly in-
creasing, is strictly concave, and is such that u(0) = 0,
u′ (0) = ∞ , and there exists y′ > 0 satisfying u(y′ )=y′ .I n
each period, each person meets one other person at ran-
dom. That is, the probability of meeting persons of a
particular type is equal to that type’s weight in the pop-
ulation. For example, the probability that a given person
meets someone who produces what the given person
consumes is 1/N.
Why assume random meetings in pairs? Implicit in
all descriptions of absence-of-double-coincidence diffi-
culties is that not everyone is together. A general model
would posit costs of people getting together. The model
studied here is an extreme version in which meeting one
person in a period is free and meeting any other person
in that period is inﬁnitely costly. When put together with
the assumed specialization in consumption and produc-
tion, such meetings in pairs give rise to a complete
absence of double-coincidence meetings. The one free
meeting could conceivably be made exogenous or en-
dogenous. (See Corbae, Temzelides, and Wright 2000 for
a model in which it is endogenous.) Here it is made exog-
enous. When these models were ﬁrst formulated, the ran-
domness was adopted because it is the simplest form that
such exogeneity can take. For the analysis that follows,
the randomness and implied uncertainty are crucial. The
randomness amounts to assuming that a person may or
may not encounter a consumption opportunity and may
or may not encounter an earnings opportunity. This is a
complete-economy version of the kind of uncertainty re-
garding expenditures and receipts that has long been a
part of well-known partial equilibrium models of money
demand. (See, for example, Miller and Orr 1966 and
Goldman 1974.) More generally, some such uncertainty
has almost always been assumed in inventory theory.
Therefore, it should not be regarded as a strange ingredi-
ent in a model of trade.
The absence of double-coincidence meetings and the
perishable nature of the produced goods imply that no
trade takes place without some tangible asset or some
form of credit. When these models were initially formu-
lated, the goal was to ensure the essentiality of tangible
assets. This was done by ruling out credit of any kind via
the assumption that people are anonymous. A different
way to rule out credit, which is convenient for what I
want to discuss, is to assume that people have known
identities as described above, but that they cannot com-
mit to future actions and that each person’s history is
private information. Throughout, I will maintain the no-
commitment assumption. However, I will adopt less ex-
treme variants of the private-history assumption.
The potentially helpful role of such knowledge is re-
lated to the uncertainty implied by the random meetings.
The criterion for the mechanism design problem I study
is an ex ante representive-agent criterion, ex ante in be-
ing before the assignment of types and initial money
holdings. If there were no incentive constraints, then the
best outcome according to that criterion would be con-
sumption and production equal to y* in every single-
coincidence meeting, where y* is the solution to the max-
imization of z(y) ≡ u(y)−y by the choice of y. This
outcome is unattainable under a ﬁxed stock of outside
money if no commitment and privacy of histories are
assumed and if money is valuable in the sense that ex-
pected discounted utility is weakly increasing in money
holdings.The proof is by contradiction. If that outcome were
attained, then expected discounted utility at the start of
each period, before meetings, would be constant and, in
particular, would not depend on money holdings. But
then people would be unwilling to produce to acquire
money. Nor would they be willing to produce without
acquiring money: with no subsequent knowledge on the
part of anyone else about whether people produced or
not, there could not be a penalty for failing to produce.
More generally, sizable output would not be produced in
a meeting between a producer who has experienced a
long run of being a producer and a consumer who has
experienced a long run of being a consumer. The pro-
ducer, as a result of previous trades, would have a lot of
money and, therefore, would require a lot of money in
order to produce much now. But the consumer would
have little money because of previous expenditures. The
existence of such meetings suggests that there is a bene-
ﬁcial role for other devices which can help free people
from dependence on their recent trades. As I will show,
some knowledge of individual histories makes that pos-
sible.
Although it is not crucial for many of the results to
follow, I will use the simplifying assumption throughout
that money is indivisible and that each person can hold
at most one unit of it. I also assume that money is per-
fectly durable.
An Updating Lag
As part of a research initiative on payments sponsored
by the Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, Narayana Kocherlakota and I took
up the question of how to represent the role of techno-
logical advances in payment arrangements. We began
with the necessity result and the background environ-
ment just described. Therefore, we knew about the best
mechanism in two extreme cases regarding knowledge
of individual histories: with no public knowledge, all
trade has to involve money, while with complete public
knowledge, money is superﬂuous (the necessity result).
We decided to formulate intermediate situations. Our
ﬁrst thought was to follow some of the literature on
bounded rationality and assume that a limited chunk of
most recent history is public knowledge. At least as we
conceived of this approach, it would not work in the
setting just described. Even knowing what people did
last period seems to be equivalent to knowing everything
in that setting. In particular, it would seem sufficient to
know whether potential producers in single-coincidence
meetings in the last period produced the “right” amount.
Therefore, we looked for an alternative way of specify-
ing intermediate situations.
The alternative we pursued is a lag in updating the
public record of individual histories. (See Kocherlakota
and Wallace 1998.) Suppose that in each period t, there
is a complete record of individual histories, but only up
to t − K for some positive integer K. Now consider the
possibility that each producer in a single-coincidence
meeting produces a positive amount y, as a sort of gift,
and that anyone who is discovered to have not produced
y never receives production from anyone else. If a pro-
ducer considers defecting in some period by not produc-
ing, then the producer looks forward to K periods dur-
ing which he or she will be an undiscovered defector.
During that time the defector will not produce, but will
consume. Obviously, then, the sacriﬁce in terms of a fu-
ture payoff from defecting in some period is decreasing
in K and approaches zero as K →∞ . In that sense, such
a lag in updating histories works. It also seems attractive
in terms of our original goal, which was to relate techno-
logical advances to the way transactions are made. Such
advances have made it possible to quickly update the
public record of individual histories.
The formulation we adopted was not a deterministic
lag, but a probabilistic lag. We assumed that each period
there is a probability, denoted ρ , that histories are up-
dated fully. This speciﬁcation produces an average lag in
updating, which is 1/ρ periods. Thus, a defector looks
forward to, on average, 1/ρ periods during which he or
she is undiscovered. This is a bit simpler than a determin-
istic lag.
The only tangible asset in the model is a ﬁxed stock
of outside money denoted by m, where m ∈ [0,1] is the
amount per specialization type. (If holdings are symmet-
ric across specialization types, then m is the fraction who
have a unit of money and 1 − m is the fraction who do
not.)
The timing is as follows. At the start of a period, a
drawing determines whether the public record of individ-
ual histories is updated. Then meetings occur. Then the
next period starts. Consideration is limited to a simple
class of deterministic allocations that are symmetric over
specialization types and are stationary. Given the sym-
metry, only single-coincidence meetings are relevant. In
each such meeting, there is a (potential) producer and a
(potential) consumer. Let yij ∈ R+ denote production
when the producer has i units of money and the consum-
er has j units, and let aij ∈ {0,1} denote whether there is
an exchange of money holdings, where aij = 0 means no
exchange and aij = 1 means an exchange. Let (y,a) de-
note the collection of pairs (yij,aij) for i, j ∈ {0,1} ×
{0,1}.
Here I will say that (y,a) is (weakly) implementable
if there exists some game which has a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium with an outcome of (y,a). To formu-
late the claim about the set of (y,a) that is implement-
able, introducing notation for expected discounted utili-
ties is helpful. Thus, let vi and v′i be the expected
discounted utilities of a nondefector and an undiscov-
ered defector, respectively, with i units of money at the
start of a period just before the new drawing that deter-
mines whether histories are updated. Also, for a single-
coincidence meeting in which the producer has i units
of money and the consumer has j units, let Pij and Cij be
producer and consumer payoffs, respectively, from fol-
lowing (y,a) when everyone else follows (y,a). Then
(1) Pij ≡ −yij + β [aijvj +( 1 −aij)vi]
and
(2) Cij ≡ u(yij)+β [aijvi +( 1 −aij)vj].





j=0(mj/N)]β viwhere m0 ≡ 1 − m and m1 ≡ m. [For a given (y,a), equa-
tion (3) is a pair of linear simultaneous equations in v0
and v1 which have a unique solution in terms of (y,a).]
I write the expression for v′ under the assumptions
that defection once discovered gives a payoff of zero,
that everyone else follows (y,a), and that the options in
any meeting are to behave according to (y,a) or to have







where P′ij and C′ji are given by equations (1) and (2), re-
spectively, except that v′k appears in place of vk, and
where the maximization functions appear because it is
costless for a defector to defect again. [That is, v′i equals
the product of ρ and zero plus the product of (1−ρ ) and
the right side of equation (4).] For a given (y,a), equation
(4) is a pair of simultaneous equations in v′0 and v′1. Al-
though equation (4) is nonlinear because of the maxi-
mization terms, it, too, has a unique solution in terms of
(y,a).
The claim about implementability is that (y,a)i s
(weakly) implementable if and only if there exist v and
v′ such that (3) and (4) hold, v1 ≥ v0, v′1 ≥ v′0 (the free
disposal conditions),
(5) Pij ≥β v′i
and
(6) Cij ≥β v′j.
The complete proof is given in Kocherlakota and Wal-
lace 1998. Here I want to outline the sufficiency part,
which shows that if (y,a) satisﬁes inequalities (5) and (6),
then (y,a) is implementable. I can associate with any
(y,a) the following game. In each meeting, the two peo-
ple move simultaneously and choose from the set {yes,
no}. If either plays no, then the meeting is autarkic: each
leaves the meeting with what was brought into the meet-
ing, and the person who plays no becomes an undiscov-
ered defector. If both play yes, then the action called for
by (y,a) is carried out. The following are proposed equi-
librium strategies:
• After a defection has become public knowledge,
producers play no.
• If a defection has not become public knowledge or
has not been witnessed, then everyone plays yes.
• If a defection has not become public knowledge but
has been witnessed, then the strategy corresponding
to the maximization terms in (4) is used.
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Given the constraints, it follows that this is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium and that the associated outcome
is (y,a) because no one defects.
Kocherlakota and Wallace 1998 shows that for suffi-
ciently small values of ρ , those close enough to zero,
almost all trade involves the use of outside money and
that for values of ρ close enough to one, outside money
is not needed. Aside from that description, the main re-
sult obtained there is that ex ante welfare, measured be-
fore initial assignments of money, is increasing in ρ .
This follows because v′ is decreasing in ρ . Although
hardly a surprise, I know of no other model that displays
a sense in which technological advances improve wel-
fare through their effect on the way transactions are
made. Notice also that the monotonicity of welfare seems
not to depend on the assumption that money is indivisible
and that there is a unit upper bound on individual hold-
ings.
Known and Unknown Histories
The Kocherlakota-Wallace speciﬁcation implies a mix of
transactions made using outside money and transactions
made using gifts. I now turn to work in which transac-
tions are made using inside money and gifts.
In Cavalcanti and Wallace 1999a, b, we pursued an
idea ﬁrst broached in a conversation with the late Rao
Aiyagari. The idea is to have some people whose histo-
ries are known and others whose histories are unknown
and to have the former be issuers of inside money and
the latter be users of inside money. Behind this idea is
the notion that issuers of inside money are making prom-
ises of some sort—perhaps to redeem inside money—-
and that people with known histories can be made to
keep promises.
To pursue that idea, we made two amendments to
the background environment described earlier. We as-
sumed that a given fraction of each specialization type,
denoted B, have known individual histories and that the
rest, the fraction 1 − B, have unknown individual histo-
ries, where B is a parameter. The parameter B can be
interpreted as the society’s capacity for keeping track of
individual histories. We also assumed that each person
is equipped with a printing press that can turn out indi-
visible and perfectly durable objects called notes. Each
press turns out uniform notes, but the notes turned out
by any two presses are distinguishable. The last proviso
is a way to rule out counterfeiting. In Cavalcanti and
Wallace 1999a, b, we called those with known histories
bankers and everyone else nonbankers. While I will
stick with those labels here, notice that the only distinc-
tion between bankers and nonbankers is what is com-
monly known about their histories. This speciﬁcation is,
of course, another way to describe situations that are in-
termediate between complete privacy of individual his-
tories, B = 0, and complete public knowledge of indi-
vidual histories, B =1 .
If B = 0 (everyone is a nonbanker), then, not surpris-
ingly, the existence of the printing presses does not mat-
ter. To see this, suppose that B = 0 and that there is a
fraction of nonbankers whose notes are treated uniformly
and accepted by other nonbankers. Then the note issuers
never produce—in particular, they do not produce to ac-
quire notes because they can always issue new notes.
And, of course, the nonissuers never destroy notes.
Therefore, the stock of notes is growing without bound.
That, in turn, precludes the existence of an equilibrium
in which such notes are valuable. When B > 0, the same
argument does not apply. Those with known histories
can be induced by the threat of punishment to produce in
exchange for a note and to destroy the note. Despite that
possibility, I will ignore note issue by nonbankers be-
cause I am looking for optima, and I suspect that note
issue by nonbankers would not be optimal because thenonbanker issuers would never produce. From now on,
then, notes refers to notes issued by bankers.
In Cavalcanti and Wallace 1999a, we studied mech-
anisms which are simple in that and other respects. We
looked at mechanisms which are symmetric across spe-
cialization types and in which all notes, all those issued
by bankers, are treated symmetrically in equilibrium. We
also imposed stationarity, which includes the require-
ment that the stock of notes held by nonbankers be con-
stant and that actions of bankers depend on only one
feature of their histories: whether or not they have de-
fected. We also assumed that note holdings are observed.
The crucial feature that permits existence of steady states
with valuable notes is the possibility of bankers being
punished if they defect. That threat induces bankers to
produce to acquire a note even though such production
is a gift because a note is useless to them.
In Cavalcanti and Wallace 1999a, we ignored outside
money and attempted to say things about the solution to
the following optimum problem. Subject to participation
constraints and to the steady-state conditions, choose
what happens in meetings to maximize nonbankers’ ex-
pected discounted utility subject to the choice leaving
bankers no worse off than nonbankers. We chose that
objective because history has no shortage of people and
groups proposing to governments that they be allowed to
issue objects that resemble the notes in our model.
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generally say that their scheme is intended to improve
the welfare of others. Our objective took that professed
goal seriously. At the same time, we do not expect the
issuers to end up worse off if their scheme is accepted.
Despite all the simplifying assumptions, this was not
a simple optimum problem. In addition to variables that
describe when notes get transferred and issued and de-
stroyed, the choice variables include ﬁve distinct output
amounts: the amount produced in exchange for a note in
a single-coincidence meeting between nonbankers, the
amount produced by a nonbanker in exchange for a note
from a banker, the amount produced in single-coinci-
dence meetings between bankers, and two amounts pro-
duced by bankers in meetings with nonbanker consum-
ers: one amount when the nonbanker has a note and one
when the nonbanker does not have a note. Thus, for ex-
ample, we did not impose that the amount a banker gets
from a nonbanker when a note is issued is the same as
that produced by a banker when redeeming a note or that
either is the same as the amount that a note trades for
among nonbankers. In particular, then, notes can be re-
deemed for more than they trade for among nonbankers
which, in turn, exceeds what is given up to acquire a
note from a banker. Such a mechanism has notes bearing
interest in an expected value sense.
Unfortunately, we were able to say very little about
the solution to the optimum problem we posed. We
showed that an optimum has notes being issued, being
used by nonbankers, and being redeemed. But in other
respects we could say very little. We were not able to
demonstrate that the objective is increasing in B, that the
constraint that bankers be no worse off than nonbankers
is binding, or that an optimum has notes bearing interest
in the sense described above. Subsequently, we realized
that our model could be used to compare inside and out-
side money as alternative ways of supporting exchange.
That comparison appears in Cavalcanti and Wallace
1999b, where we produced the following strong result:
the set of implementable outcomes using outside money
is a strict subset of outcomes using inside money. This is
the result I will discuss in detail.
What exactly am I comparing? The outside-money
world has a constant stock of outside money and no note
issue. Having no note issue is implementable because if
bankers are not threatened with future punishment for
not producing in exchange for a note, then they are will-
ing not to produce to get one. Given this behavior of
bankers, then, notes, being intrinsically useless, can be
ignored for the usual reason: if each person thinks that
others in the future will not produce to acquire notes,
then no one currently produces to acquire them. I have
also imposed considerable symmetry and stationarity.
Thus, I limit what happens in a single-coincidence meet-
ing to depend at most on the identity (banker or non-
banker) and state (having zero or one unit of outside
money) of the producer and the consumer. It follows that
there are 16 potential output levels. Although some are
obviously constrained to be zero by participation con-
straints—in particular, nonbankers never give gifts—it is
important to notice that the outside-money arrangement
allows for gifts from bankers to each other and to non-
bankers.
The inside-money world either has no outside money
or outside money exists and is ignored. Given that out-
side money is an intrinsically useless object, ignoring it
is implementable. Then to facilitate a comparison with
the outside-money world, the same kind of symmetry
and stationarity is imposed. However, one distinction is
important. As in the outside-money world, in the inside-
money world, the state for a nonbanker is note holdings.
However, the state for a banker is not note holdings, be-
cause bankers can always issue notes.
I assume that each banker is in one of two states,
labeled 0 or 1. I need at least two states for bankers if I
am to accomplish the subset claim. Although these states
do not correspond to something tangible that bankers
hold, bankers can be made to carry around these states
because their histories are known.
4 Thus, I can propose
something like the following: half the bankers of each
specialization type start in state 0, and half start in state
1. In each period bankers switch to the other state, and
only those in state 1 issue a note in a meeting with a
nonbanker without a note. As part of stationarity, I only
consider steady states in which the fractions who are
nonbankers in each state and who are bankers in each
state are constant.
A uniﬁed notation can describe outcomes under either
the inside-money or the outside-money arrangement. Al-
though I will not present all the details, some are needed.
Most of the notation is, again, for single-coincidence
meetings. I need three variables for such meetings: one
to describe production, one to describe the state transi-
tion for producers, and one to describe the state transi-
tion for consumers. Thus, I let production (and consump-




The superscripts denote identity: k, l ∈ {b (banker), n
(nonbanker)}, with k denoting the identity of the produc-
er and l the identity of the consumer. The subscripts de-




j ∈ {0,1} denote the




j ∈ {0,1} denote
the state transition of the consumer, where the super-
scripts and subscripts have the same meanings as they do
for production. Here 0 in the range means keep the cur-
rent state and 1 means switch to the other state. Notice
that were I describing only the use of outside money, I
could get by with a single money transfer variable that
describes whether or not the trading partners exchange
money holdings as in the Kocherlakota-Wallace model.
Here, because bankers can issue notes in the inside-mon-
ey world, a nonbanker can be given a note no matter the
state of the banker. Hence, I need separate state-transi-
tion variables. I also need some notation to describe the
possibility that a banker gives a gift of money, either out-
side money or a note, in a no-coincidence meeting with a
nonbanker. (Although nonbankers never give gifts, a gen-





denote whether a person with identity k in state i switches
states in a no-coincidence meeting with a person with
identity l in state j. (Again, 0 in the range means keep the
current state and 1 means switch states.) Finally, I need
notation for the distribution of bankers and nonbankers
across states. I let x
k
i with k ∈ {b,n} and i ∈ {0,1} denote
the fraction of each production-consumption specializa-
tion type who have identity k (b for banker, n for non-
banker) and who are in state i. Because each person must










Denote an allocation by (y,p,q,r,x), where each sym-
bol is the relevant collection of production, state transi-
tion, and distribution variables. The steady-state condi-
tions are easily expressed in terms of (y,p,q,r,x); I will not
repeat them here. In addition, restrictions are implied by
the preservation of outside-money holdings in all meet-
ings and by the preservation of note holdings in meetings


































Equation (9) says that if both people in a meeting
have the same state, then neither can switch to a different
state. Equations (10) and (11) say that one person in a
meeting switches to a different state if and only if the
other does. The crucial way in which the inside- and out-
side-money worlds differ is that the state transitions are
more constrained in the outside-money world. When
outside money is used, (9), (10), and (11) must hold in
all meetings. When inside money is used, they must hold
only in meetings between nonbankers, when k = l = n.
It is again convenient to express participation con-
straints in terms of expected discounted utilities. Let v
k
i
denote the expected discounted utility for a person with
identity k who starts a period in state i. The stationarity
implies that v
k


































where i′≠ i. Notice that for a given allocation (y,p,q,r,x),
equation (12) consists of two pairs of equations, each





1. Those equations have a unique solution.
Aside from the free disposal conditions, I consider



















Here i′≠ i. The others require that nonbankers have non-
negative gains from trade when they consume and when








































where, again, i′≠ i.
The implementability claim is that a steady-state al-
location (y,p,q,r,x), either an inside-money one or an out-
side-money one, is implementable if and only if there
exist v
k
i such that constraints (12)–(15) and the free dis-
posal conditions hold. The same kind of game as de-
scribed for the Kocherlakota-Wallace model can be used
here to show that any such allocation (y,p,q,r,x) is weakly
implementable. (See Cavalcanti and Wallace 1999b for a
proof.)
In inequalities (13)–(15), the left sides represent pay-
offs from not defecting and the right sides represent pay-
offs from defecting. For bankers, the payoff from defect-
ing is permanent autarky; for nonbankers, the payoff is
autarky in the meeting only. One consequence of (15) is
that a necessary condition for positive nonbanker pro-
duction is that the nonbanker switches states. In other
words, nonbankers do not engage in gift-giving. That is
not true of bankers. Inequality (13) does not imply that a
banker must switch states in order to produce. Notice
also that the only banker activity that is constrained is
banker production. That is because banker defection
leads to autarky in the meeting and then to permanent
autarky. (See Cavalcanti and Wallace 1999b.) It follows
that a banker may be tempted to defect only when the
banker is asked to experience current disutility, namely,
when asked to produce. In particular, a banker is never
tempted to defect by issuing a note when the allocation
says that a note should not be issued, as is always the
case in what I am calling outside-money allocations and
as may be the case for inside-money allocations. Finally,
notice that inside- and outside-money allocations are not
distinguished by different participation constraints. There-
fore, as asserted above, the two kinds of allocations aredistinguished by the different restrictions on state transi-
tions that come from applying (9), (10), and (11) to all
meetings in the case of outside money and only to meet-
ings between nonbankers in the case of inside money.
With a more constrained law of motion for individual
states in the case of outside money than in the case of
inside money and with identical participation constraints,
the strict set inclusion result is an obvious consequence.
The subset result is immediate. The strictness is achieved
by giving an example of an outcome that is implement-
able in the case of inside money, but not in the case of
outside money. That is easy to do. The example I give
involves having a banker consumer issue a note in any
meeting with a nonbanker producer who does not have a
note. That cannot happen in the case of outside money
because the steady-state conditions would be violated.
All bankers would have to have a unit of outside money
and sometimes surrender it. If bankers always have out-
side money, then they can never acquire a unit. By the
steady-state conditions, this implies that bankers never
surrender a unit, a contradiction.
In Cavalcanti and Wallace 1999b, we made substan-
tial use of the unit upper bound on money holdings only
when giving an example of an inside-money outcome
which cannot be achieved using outside money. There-
fore, I suspect that the strict set inclusion applies quite
generally. In particular, it should survive both more gen-
eral money holdings and richer dependence on banker
histories. In the case of outside money, a banker’s ability
to acquire production from a nonbanker is tied to the
banker’s holdings of outside money, which depend on
the banker’s previous trades. Using inside money, the
banker can always issue a note and, therefore, is not con-
strained by recent trades. Nor does it seem essential that
the inside-money world have no outside money. I suspect
that I can reinterpret any inside-money steady state as one
in which the stock of notes held by nonbankers is a mix
of outside and inside money.
As regards interpretation, to some extent the inside-
money world looks like a world of private bankers issu-
ing notes under an arrangement in which they agree to
redeem each other’s notes. A modern analog of our
notes is stored value cards. However, because our bank-
ers are identical to everyone else and because they re-
ceive goods when issuing notes and give goods when
redeeming notes, it is at least as apt to view the inside-
money world as a world of trade credit in which the is-
suers of trade credit redeem each other’s liabilities and in
which these liabilities trade hands among nonissuers.
Whatever I call the notes and their issuers, the inside-
money world just described is a uniﬁed system in the
sense that all notes are treated symmetrically. The same
model can be used to describe systems that are not uni-
ﬁed. Here is one such system. Suppose that the set of
bankers is itself divided into equal-measure subsets.
Then the following is certainly implementable in the in-
side-money world. A banker producer is not punished
for treating a nonbanker with a “wrong” note, a note is-
sued by a banker not in its subset, exactly as the banker
treats a nonbanker without a note. This is consistent with
nonbankers treating all notes symmetrically because the
probability of a note being right or wrong does not de-
pend on who issued it. The lack of punishment for not
redeeming wrong notes implies that banker production
for nonbankers with wrong notes is the same as produc-
tion for nonbankers without notes. Since this restriction
is not present in the case of outside money, I conjecture
that the subset result fails when such a nonuniﬁed sys-
tem is imposed. In other words, if the mechanism design
problem is constrained to have a nonuniﬁed inside-mon-
ey system, then there is a role for both inside and outside
money in the sense that the sets of outcomes using ex-
clusively one or the other are not subsets of each other.
Another conceivable way to get roles for both outside
and inside money is to make the knowledge of individu-
al histories of bankers imperfect.
5
Concluding Remarks
Has anything worthwhile come out of this modeling en-
deavor? Are there new insights? I have emphasized two
results. In the Kocherlakota-Wallace (1998) representa-
tive-agent setting, shortening the lag with which individ-
ual histories are made public knowledge enhances wel-
fare. In the Cavalcanti-Wallace (1999a, b) setting in
which some people have known histories and others un-
known histories, inside money can achieve strictly more
allocations than outside money. Although the ﬁrst result
is not surprising, it does require a background setting in
which transactions are difficult. The comparison of in-
side and outside money seems to be new. Moreover,
once elaborated, that result seems quite plausible: the use
of outside money is more restrictive because it ties trad-
ing opportunities more closely to past transactions than
does the use of inside money.
Finally, it is worth noting that the mechanism design
approach bypasses the usual industrial organization cate-
gories of competition, oligopoly, and monopoly. While
people in the second setting, including those with known
histories, are selﬁsh and individually small, they are not
price-taking competitors in the usual sense. They behave
in ways that would not ﬁt into a standard competitive
analysis. Given the obvious role for joint behavior in the
ﬁnancial system—for example, as is required for the
operation of clearinghouses—it seems desirable to use
frameworks which allow for such arrangements.
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Sveriges Riksbank Work-
shop, “Challenges for Modern Central Banking,” Stockholm, January 14 and 15,
2000.
1For an exposition of mechanism design, see Kreps 1990, chap. 18.
2According to this game, a zero payoff for discovered defectors is achieved
through global autarky, and v′ is the discounted utility of an undiscovered defector
and of someone who has witnessed an undiscovered defection. There are also games
that punish only the defector. In such a game, the crucial meeting is between a dis-
covered defector with money who is a potential consumer and a nondefector pro-
ducer without money. While autarky in such a meeting can be Nash, it has the de-
fector playing a weakly dominated strategy (not offering his or her money) and is not
robust to cooperative defection by the pair in the meeting. Suppose, instead, that the
discovered defector gives up money for ε amount of the good, where ε is small. Then
no matter how small is ε , playing yes is not a weakly dominated strategy for the
defector, and there is no cooperative defection by the pair from that trade. Because
this is also true if ε = 0, a zero payoff for a discovered defector can be achieved in
this way, with punishment only of the defector.
3A famous instance is John Law’s banking proposal, which was rejected by the
English, but, at least for a time, accepted by the French in the early 18th century.
4These states for bankers are an example of the kind of intangible state variable
used in the earlier argument for the claim that imperfect knowledge of individual his-
tories is necessary for the essentiality of money.
5This idea is pursued in Mills 2000.References
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